22
of the same class or description under like circumstances. But precisely what rights are guarantied by this clause, or how it is to be enforced, has never been judicially determined, nor has its practical construction been uniform; it is therefore a very unsafe guide in interpreting the much clearer clause of the Constitution, under which this question arose, the evident intention of which is to require of a suitor no qualification but residence in a different State or country from the party sued.
The object of this provision, as declared by the supreme court, was, "to have a tribunal in each State, presumed to be free from local influence, and to which all who were non-residents or aliens might resort for legal redress." Gordon v. Longest, 16 Peters, 104. But if the novel doctrine under consideration be true, a person of color, kidnapped or unlawfully imprisoned at the South, would be without redress, except in the State courts; as on the other hand, the only remedy of a citizen of a Southern State against a colored person at the North, for a debt or personal injury, would be in the courts of a Northern State. And thus this wise provision of the Constitution would fail to reach those very cases in which an impartial administration of justice would most require its application.
But the Chief Justice's construction of the Constitution, if taken to be as he repeatedly states it, is not limited in its consequences to the rights of individuals, but seriously affects the political power of the States. For, after speaking of two clauses in the Constitution, which "point directly and specifically to the negro race as a separate class of persons," and then of the Constitution as reserving to the States the right to import slaves until 1808, and as pledging the States to deliver up fugitive, slaves to their masters, he says: "These two provisions show, conclusively, that neither the description of persons therein referred to, nor their descendants, were embraced in any of the other provisions of the Constitution." p. 411. And again: "The only two provisions, which point to them and include them, treat them as property." p. 425. What then becomes of that clause of the Constitution which directs that "representatives shall be apportioned among the several Slates according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons"? We all know that this clause was thus framed with the very object of allowing the slaveholding
