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CHAPTER XIII.

(November 27th, 1914)

THE COMMAND OF THE AIR.

§ 85. Air Power as Affecting Combined Tactics. Some indication has been given in the preceding articles of the influence that the advent of aircraft may be expected to have on the tactical value and employment of the other Arms of the Services; more particularly attention has been called to the changes that will almost inevitably be found necessary in the employment of cavalry. Certain writers, basing their views too exclusively on the experience of the present war, have expressed the opinion that the aeroplane, and, more broadly, aircraft, though of the greatest service and utility as a new means of reconnaissance (and, to some extent, of offence), will not have any material influence on the tactical employment of the older Arms, either Infantry, Cavalry, or Artillery. In the opinion of the author this view is fallacious, and the present war, at least so far as developed, cannot be taken as a criterion. It may be thought overbold thus to give preference to purely theoretical deduction in place of actual experience, but a little consideration will show that the experience, such as it is, cannot be regarded as a serious indication of the future. It is an undeniable fact that the aeroplane has, in the present war, been able to give information of the positions and movements of the enemy such as would have been otherwise unobtainable, and in a few cases it has enabled points to be attacked which could not have

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