as essentially work for the lathe or planing-machine, but it had no opportunity of demonstrating its full capacity until installed in sufficient numbers. The above is merely an illustration chosen from innumerable examples which might be cited.
§ 86. General Influence on Combined Tactics. Aircraft as affecting Attack and Defence. Without attempting to discuss fully the influence of the development of the Fourth Arm on questions of "grand" or "combined" tactics, mention may be made of one salient fact which has already become manifest; the influence of aircraft as a means of reconnaissance has greatly increased the power of defence without, it would appear, conferring a commensurate benefit on the attack. It is possible that the fighting power of the aeroplane may in the future be found to redress the balance of advantages but, so far, there is no definite indication that this will be the case.
It may be stated tersely that the equilibrium between forces conducting respectively an attack and defence is normally maintained by a balance between strategic and tactical advantages. Thus the tactical advantage lies with the defender, in so far that he may be presumed to occupy chosen positions carefully prepared and fortified in advance, so that to place the attack on terms of equality the force employed must (locally at least) be numerically stronger; a numerical superiority many times that of the defending force may be required. The strategic advantage is with the attacking force, owing to the fact that the general in command can select any one of a number of possible points at which to deliver his assault. By exerting pressure at other points, by way of feint, he can keep the enemy in ignorance of his intentions whilst he is concentrating at the point chosen for the main attack, and so prevent him (the defender)
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