matter of minor alterations, ambiguities as to gauging, etc.; also with the loss of any real pretentions to secrecy. Lastly, there is a tendency to divorce the aircraft development of the two Services—the Army and Navy; this the author considers to be bad. The main supplies of established types may certainly be obtained by the two Services from independent sources or from different contractors, but to separate the experimental or developmental phase of construction appears to have nothing to commend it.
The deficiencies of the present régime, such as they are, in no way reflect adversely on the existing staff and personnel of the Royal Aircraft Factory as it stands; in fact, it is undeniably greatly to the credit of all concerned that so much has been done. It is, however, hard to say who is supposed to be responsible for supplying initiative and foresight. That initiative has not been lacking is evident, but it is an open question whether anyone could have been accused of neglect of duty if the factory had never developed or constructed a solitary aeroplane.
Actually that which is lacking is something analogous to a directorate, a Board whose existence would ensure continuity of policy, and whose members would be definitely responsible for the sufficiency of the constructional programme so far as its developmental side is concerned, and for securing the needed Treasury support.
§ 113. A Board of Aeronautical Construction. The duties adumbrated in the preceding paragraph would be best deputed to a Board of Aeronautical Construction, in which both Army and Navy are represented by the responsible heads respectively of the two branches of the Arm—namely, the Director-General of Military Aeronautics and the Director of the Air Department of the Admiralty, in addition to a strong civilian contingent selected for their eminence or attainments in such
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