established ethics of warfare; we recognise that we are, in the protection of our capital, face to face with a necessary problem of national defence of the first magnitude. Let us admit that, given a determined enemy in the possession of the French and Belgian littoral, the problem in future will be increasingly difficult. Let us go further, and, for the purpose of argument, assume that it may become impossible. We have no assurance in all the circumstances that this is not the truth. What then will be the measures by which the new situation can be met? It is wholesome to consider the position on this basis.
§ 123. The Incentive to Attack. The Real Source of Weakness. It is evident that if the administrative headquarters of the Army and Navy were removed to some less accessible position, and in fact if London were to cease to be the centre of Government, the main incentive to attack, as a military operation, would be destroyed, and the danger in question disposed of. Obviously London as a city would be no less vulnerable than before, and it would be open to be wantonly raided unless adequate means of defence were provided. Measures of defence, however, to be effective have always to be proportioned to the incentive to attack, and to reduce the incentive to a minimum is to make the most of such means of protection as are available. Putting this in other words, we have it that the enemy would not be prepared to pay so high a price or take the same risks for the privilege of destroying private property and murdering civilians, as he would if he were able at the same stroke to disorganize the whole administrative machinery of the State. Also, so long as any act of aggression has admittedly no military value, it may be answered by appropriate reprisal.[1]
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- ↑ A reprisal to be effective must be delivered with promptitude like the riposte of a skilled fencer. A reprisal which is too long delayed possesses no moral weight and has every appearance of an independent act of aggression; it may even plausibly
