type, whether reconnaissance, bmb-dropping, or fighting machines; our total present capacity for production is petty in comparison with what we have evidence the future will demand.
The question of the future of the Aeronautical Arm is not purely the concern of the Army and Navy, it cuts deeper; it is essentially an affair of the Nation. It is national because it concerns both Services. It is national because it is of wider and more far-reaching moment than comprised by its relation to either. It is national because it depends upon our national industrial resources, and may tax these to the uttermost; national because it is the Arm of greatest potential development in the present war, and in future warfare may decide the fate of Nations. Finally, it is national because it is the Arm which will have to be ever ready, ever mobilised, both in time of peace and war: it is the Arm which in the warfare of the future may act with decisive effect within a few hours of the outbreak of hostilities.
§131. In Conclusion. That we have temporarily the upper hand in military aeronautics there is no doubt, but this is due more to our technical prescience than to the scale or magnitude of our national preparedness. In other words, our present lead is only in part due to our own effort, it is largely due to the mistake made by the enemy prior to the war in devoting altogether disproportionate attention to the large dirigibles: Germany backed the wrong horse. The Zeppelin, from the military standpoint, has proved a complete failure. If the resources thus diverted into a useless channel had been devoted to the development of the aeroplane and strengthening of the enemy flying corps, the position from our point of view might have been nowise so satisfactory. Having been thus favoured with the advantage by what may almost be regarded as a
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