taken. On the one hand, if we regard the flying corps as merely the successor to the pre-existing balloon corps, the numbers, as they at present stand, may be regarded as sufficient; indeed, perhaps, even liberal. On the other hand, if we would recognise in the advent of the aeroplane the dawn of a fourth Arm (this being the point of view adopted by the author), the present strength, which in no case represents numerically one-twentieth part of 1 per cent, of the number of bayonets, is a truly negligible quantity. In order to get a fair perspective of the position, it is sufficient to institute a comparison with the cavalry, to which Arm, from its function, the aeronautical Arm is most closely akin; here the accepted numerical proportion in a modern army is about 6 per cent. Now there are many otherwise competent authorities who would deny to the aeroplane (or to aircraft generally) the potential importance which the author hopes satisfactorily to demonstrate is its due; let us put the matter to the test. We hear frequent reports of the work done by German aircraft, and particularly the effective tactical reconnaissance of the German aeroplanes, which appear to be continuously employed during the course of every engagement for locating our gun positions, directing gun-fire, following up bodies of troops in retreat, etc. We also hear reports of their wider field of operations, presumably reconnoitring the strategic distribution of the forces of the Allies at points remote from the enemy's lines. We may presume that the Belgian. French, and British aircraft are employed with equal success; but here, in the nature of things, the information which appears in our Press is meagre. As already pointed out, the total number of machines engaged is microscopic; the Germans are reputed to have possessed at the outbreak of hostilities some 500 machines in all. If the German cavalry had been limited to 500 mounted
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