manently attached to the independent cavalry, as in the case of the supports representing the other two Arms of the Service. Under these circumstances the command of the combined force would remain, as at present, with the cavalry leader.
(September 18th, 1914).
§ 10. The Aeroplane as an Auxiliary to Tactical Operations. The aeroplane in its employment in connection with tactical operations finds itself under conditions entirely different from those discussed in the preceding section; its duties are of a more varied character, and involve flying at lower altitudes than are compatible with security. It is likely to be almost continuously under fire, and, according to some of the experiences of the present war, it has almost as much to fear in this respect from its friends as its foes. Whereas the strategic reconnaissance machine is able to perform all its most useful work at high altitude, and avoid as far as possible the attention of, or actual contact with, the enemy, and evade pursuit by flight; the tactical machine (acting under the divisional command), whether engaged in local reconnaissance or in locating or directing gun-fire, or in other duties, must be prepared at once to tackle the enemy, and, in brief, to interfere as much as possible with the hostile aeroplane service. Under certain circumstances the instructions will undoubtedly be to make the aircraft of the enemy the first objective.
It is more than probable that it is in connection with the varied duties which in the future must fall to the Fourth Arm in its tactical usage, that differentiation of type and specialisation will eventually become the most marked. At present practically no attempt in the direction of specialisation has taken place. It is true the different machines in service vary considerably, and those responsible for the construction and specification of
21
