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§ 23
AIRCRAFT IN WARFARE.

Fig. 5b, this diagram has been reduced to give the same information in terms per cent. for a "Blue" force of constant value. Thus in its application Fig. 5b gives the correct percentage increase necessary in the fighting value of, for example, an army or fleet to give equality, on the assumption that political or strategic necessities impose the condition of dividing the said army or fleet into two in the proportions given by the lower graph, the enemy being able to attack either proportion with his full strength. Alternatively, if the constant (= 100) be taken to represent a numerical strength that would be deemed sufficient to ensure victory against the enemy, given that both fleets engage in their full strength, then the upper graph gives the numerical superiority needed to be equally sure of victory, in case, from political or other strategic necessity, the fleet has to be divided in the proportions given. In Fig. 5b abscissæ have no quantitative meaning.

§ 24. Validity of Mathematical Treatment. There are many who will be inclined to cavil at any mathematical or semi-mathematical treatment of the present subject, on the ground that with so many unknown factors, such as the morale or leadership of the men, the unaccounted merits or demerits of the weapons, and the still more unknown "chances of war," it is ridiculous to pretend to calculate anything. The answer to this is simple: the direct numerical comparison of the forces engaging in conflict or available in the event of war is almost universal. It is a factor always carefully reckoned with by the various military authorities; it is discussed ad nauseam in the Press. Yet such direct counting of forces is in itself a tacit acceptance of the applicability of mathematical principles, but confined to a special case. To accept without reserve the mere "counting of the pieces" as of value, and to deny the more extended

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