and the officers who wrote special studies as basic reference material for the monograph. I have drawn extensively on two such studies prepared by Lieutenant Colonel John R. Galvin of Combat Developments Command and Major Bobby D. Harper of the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command. Because the published version of my monograph contains no documentation, the extent of my indebtedness to these two officers is not readily apparent. Major Harber's manuscript was subsequently published by the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command under the title, Logistical Support of Airmobile Operations, Republic of Vietnam, 1961-1971.
Finally, I must recognize the two officers who were primarily responsible for researching, drafting, and compiling this volume. Colonel James J. Brockmyer, who was my senior assistant, has been associated with airmobility for more than two decades and was the editor of the test report of the 11th Air Assault Division. CW-2 Charlie M. Montgomery, who researched and typed the multiple drafts, was a special assistant to General Westmoreland for four years in Vietnam. These two officers must share with me any credit (or blame) that this study might generate.
Airmobility is no panacea; it brings with it many unique problems as well as unique capabilities. It is hoped that this study will give the reader some insight into both of these areas.
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