them entire batteries for a few packets of cigarettes. There was nothing, therefore, to hinder the Germans from starting in our pursuit even before an armistice had been officially declared and before peace negotiations had actually been begun at Brest. In fact, three or four German divisions started across Volhynia to overtake us. The skirmishes we had were with the outposts sent ahead of the armies. At the bridge over the Dnieper these outposts were no longer isolated. They consisted of several companies followed by strong battalions. One of our companies took up position at the head of the bridge and held it a whole day against big odds. Later our battalions got into action and easily routed the Germans. The bridge was held till every man and all our material had got safely across.
The question of our safe retreat now became an extremely serious one, not only strategically, but also from the point of view of transport and freedom of movement. It required all the tact and genius of our military commanders and of our patriotic leaders. All co-operated with the greatest energy and self-abnegation, and individual commanders of companies and battalions each contributed his share to make it a success. Had it not been for this sincere, whole-hearted, and devoted co-operation of all, and the initiative, courage, and intelligence of our men, the success of our retreat might have been jeopardised at the very outset. We could feel certain that the Germans would bring pressure to bear on the Bolsheviks to put all sorts of difficulties in our way, and this was clearly proved when soon afterwards the Bolsheviks demanded that we should leave most of our arms and equipment behind. No railway material was placed at our disposal, and it was, therefore, clearly a case of our taking it without asking leave or doing without it.
ROLLING STOCK SEIZED.
Our commanders, as well as our privates, always showed themselves equal to any emergency Engines, trucks, railway cars of every description, wherever found, stationed or abandoned, were seized or requisitioned by them. No discussion was tolerated. We either had to use our authority and force or give up our plan. In a short time we had under our control more than 100 engines and 3,000 cars, enough to make up seventy big transport trains on the lines between Borispol and Poltava and Kieff and Kursk. Our task was facilitated by the general disorder. Stationsmasters had become accustomed to arbitrary requisitions by the Russians before us and by the Ukrainians. There was no longer any fixed order or general direction. Russian deserters had freely compelled engine drivers and railway employees to do their bidding at all the stations, to stop passenger trains, goods trains, and empty trains, and drive in any direction, according to the caprice of the soldiery, the
