- recent similar offense was directly pertinent to the issue of intent."
- ". . . possession of a quantity of cocaine, as bearing upon the question of whether the morphine was being kept for her own use or for sale or administration to others. Starr v. State, 165 Ark. 511, 265 S. W. 54."
- "Again, where the issue was whether the accused had burned a car to collect insurance, proof that he had burned other insured vehicles was competent. Casteel v. State, 205 Ark. 82, 167 S. W. 2d 634."
- "The State was rightly allowed to prove that the defendant had gambled in other counties . . . to show the purpose of his wanderings, . . ." Davis v. State, 109 Ark. 341, 159 S. W. 1129.
- ". . . the many charges of assault with intent to commit a specified crime . . . since the accused's purpose is at issue, proof of other similar offenses is independently relevant. Stone v. State, 162 Ark. 154, 258 S. W. 116; Hearn v. State, 206 Ark. 206, 174 S. W. 2d 452; Gerlach v. State, 217 Ark. 102, 229 S. W. 2d 37."
Now, in the above eight numbered categories, I have quoted directly from the majority opinion to show cases in which the majority opinion admits that evidence of other similar offenses was admissible in each instance. I submit that when the majority admits—as it has—that in the eight categories above, the evidence of other similar acts was admissible, then the majority cannot be heard to say—with any degree of consistency—that the evidence of a similar attempted rape was not admissible in the case at bar.
In category 2 above, the majority admits that "where the charge involves unnatural sexual acts, proof of prior similar offenses has been received." I submit that rape falls in the same category as that quoted, because rape is forced sexual intercourse. In Needham v. State, 215 Ark. 935, 224 S. W. 2d 785, in discussing rape and unnatural sexual intercourse, this Court (speaking through the writer of the majority opinion in the present case), said:
