from the jurisprudence of other nations. Our theory is simply that a finding of guilty should rest upon proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused committed the exact offense for which he is being tried. We do not permit the State to bolster its appeal to the jury by proof of prior convictions, with their conclusive presumption of verity, and still less is there reason to allow the jury to be prejudiced by mere accusations of earlier misconduct on the part of the defendant. If the accused has committed other crimes, each may be examined separately in a court of law, and punishment may be imposed for those established with the required certainty. In this way alone can we avoid the elements of unfair surprise and undue prejudice that necessarily attend trial by accusation in place of trial upon facts demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.
The rule is designed to protect the innocent, but it is often invoked as a basis for excluding any evidence that tends to show the commission of another offense. We have repeatedly rejected unfounded appeals to the protection of the basic rule of exclusion. If other conduct on the part of the accused is independently relevant to the main issue—relevant in the sense of tending to prove some material point rather than merely to prove that the defendant is a criminal—then evidence of that conduct may be admissible, with a proper cautionary instruction by the court. "While the principle is usually spoken of as being an exception to the general rule, yet, as a matter of fact, it is not an exception; for it is not proof of other crimes as crimes, but merely evidence of other acts which are from their nature competent as showing knowledge, intent or design, although they may be crimes, which is admitted. In other words, the fact that evidence shows that the defendant was guilty of another crime does not prevent it being admissible when otherwise it would be competent on the issue under trial." State v. DuLaney, 87 Ark. 17, 112 S. W. 158.
Although, as stated in the above quotation, the instances of admissibility are not really exceptions to the exclusionary principle, most courts, including this one,
