Alito, J., dissenting
constitutional, and I do not understand the majority’s analysis of Alabama’s constitutional claim to suggest otherwise. Ante, at 33–34; ante, at 4 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part).
Our cases make it perfectly clear that using race as a “predominant factor” in drawing legislative districts is unconstitutional unless the stringent requirements of strict scrutiny can be satisfied,[1] and therefore if §2 can be found to require the adoption of an additional majority-minority district that was created under a process that assigned race a “predominant” role, §2 and the Constitution would be headed for a collision.
II
When the meaning of a “reasonably configured” district is properly understood, it is apparent that the decisions below must be vacated and that the cases must be remanded for the application of the proper test. In its analysis of whether the plaintiffs satisfied the first Gingles precondition, the District Court gave much attention to some traditional districting criteria—specifically, compactness and avoiding the splitting of political subdivisions and communities of interest—but it failed to consider whether the plaintiffs had shown that their illustrative districts were created without giving race a “predominant role.” Singleton v. Merrill, 582 F. Supp. 3d 924, 1008–1016 (ND Ala. 2022). For this reason, the District Court’s §2 analysis was deficient.
It is true that the District Court addressed the question of race-predominance when it discussed and rejected the State’s argument that the plaintiffs’ maps violated the Equal Protection Clause, but the court’s understanding of predominance was deeply flawed. The court began this part
- ↑ Although our cases have posited that racial predominance may be acceptable if strict scrutiny is satisfied, the Court does not contend that it is satisfied here.
