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Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)
9

Thomas, J., dissenting

with “equal opportunity” serving an ancillary function.[1] 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15). Relying significantly on §2(b)’s disclaimer of a right to proportional representation, we also held that §2 does not enact a “freewheeling disparate-impact regime.” Id., at ___, and n. 14 (slip op., at 22, and n. 14). Brnovich further stressed the value of “benchmarks with which … challenged [electoral] rule[s] can be compared,” id., at ___ (slip op., at 17), and that “a meaningful comparison is essential” in judging the significance of any challenged scheme’s racially disparate impact. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 18). To the extent §2 applies to districting plans, then, it requires that they be “equally open to participation” by voters of all races, but it is not a pure disparate-impact statute and does not guarantee proportional representation.

In its main argument here, Alabama simply carries these principles to their logical conclusion: Any vote-dilution benchmark must be race neutral. See Brief for Appellants 32–46. Whatever “equal openness” means in the context of single-member districting, no “meaningful comparison” is possible using a benchmark that builds in a presumption in favor of minority-controlled districts. Indeed, any benchmark other than a race-neutral one would render the vote-dilution inquiry fundamentally circular, allowing courts to conclude that a districting plan “dilutes” a minority’s voting strength “on account of race” merely because it does not measure up to an ideal already defined in racial terms. Such a question-begging standard would not answer our precedents’ demand for an “objective,” “reasonable benchmark.” Holder, 512 U. S., at 881 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). Nor could any nonneutral benchmark be reconciled with Brnovich’s rejection of a disparate-impact


  1. While Brnovich involved a time-place-and-manner voting rule, not a vote-dilution challenge to a districting plan, its analysis logically must apply to vote-dilution cases if the text of §2 covers such claims at all.