Case: 23-10362 Document: 543-1 Page: 26 Date Filed: 08/16/2023
Id. at 499. This understanding of Summers is reinforced by the Court’s recent decision in Department of Education v. Brown, 143 S. Ct. 2343 (2023). There, the Court reiterated its view that no plaintiff had shown that he or she actively planned to visit the sites at issue. See id. at 2354 n.3 (“[N]o plaintiff in Summers had standing because none had alleged specific plans to observe nature in one of the areas at issue….”).
Summers does not stand for the proposition that courts must categorically reject standing when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant’s action puts hundreds of association members at risk of future injury. It stands for the proposition that courts must treat such assertions with caution. The standard for making this showing is high, but the Medical Organizations and Doctors have met it. They have provided multiple examples of organization members who sustained the exact harm they say will recur. They have explained that the conditions producing that harm remain in place. And they have testified to having hundreds of members who are reasonably likely to be harmed. At this stage, that is enough.
b. Cognizable Injury
In addition to being sufficiently imminent, threatened injuries must also be legally cognizable. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2204–07 (2021); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562. The injuries here are. To begin, economic harm—like damage to one’s business interest—is a quintessential Article III injury. TransUnion, 142 S. Ct. at 2204; see, e.g., Greater Phila. Chamber of Com. v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116, 131 (3d Cir. 2020) (recognizing that businesses had standing to challenge local ordinance, which would hamper hiring and salary decisions). The Doctors therefore sustain a concrete injury when they are forced to divert time and resources away from their regular patients. Dr. Skop Declaration ¶ 32; Dr. Francis Declaration ¶ 12; Dr. Harrison Declaration ¶¶ 27–30; see also All. for Hippocratic Med.,
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