whatever mission General Westmoreland gave him he would execute it as if he were directly under Westmoreland's operational control. There was a certain amount of confusion, nonetheless, as to whether the Korean force in South Vietnam would actually come directly under U.S. operational control or whether it would be a distinct fighting force working in close co-ordination with the other allies but under separate control. The confusion was perhaps based on misunderstanding since there never had been a clear-cut agreement between the Korean government and the U.S. government concerning operational control.
On 2 July 1965 General Westmoreland had submitted to Admiral Sharp his views on the command and control organization to be used when a Korean division arrived in Vietnam. If a Korean regiment deployed to Vietnam before the establishment of a field force headquarters, MACV would exercise operational control of both Korean and U.S. units through a task force headquarters located in the II Corps Tactical Zone. When the full Korean division arrived, the division would assume command of the Korean regiment and would come under the direct operational command of the field force headquarters.
General Westmoreland had no objections to a unified Korean command, provided the command was under his operational control and he retained the authority to place the Korean regiment, brigade, or division under the operational control of a U.S. task force headquarters or U.S. field force headquarters. Such an arrangement was necessary so that the U.S. commander would have the authority to maneuver the Korean division or any of its elements to meet a changing tactical situation.
Under this arrangement, noncombatant Korean forces would continue to be under General Westmoreland's operational control through the provisions of the International Military Assistance Policy Council, later designated the Free World Military Assistance Policy Council. Inasmuch as General Westmoreland wanted the commanding general of the Korean division to be free to devote all his energies to tactical matters, he recommended that the Republic of Korea Military Assistance Group, Vietnam, be augmented so that it could assume the responsibilities of a Korean unified command.
After the arrival in Vietnam of the advance planning group for the Korean division and after a series of conferences, new working arrangements were signed between the Vietnamese armed forces and the Commander, Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam, on 5 September and between General Westmoreland and the Commander of the Korean forces on 6 September. The
