[ex]tensive operations throughout the CTZ to destroy enemy forces and to provide maximum possible support to the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. The prime ingredient in the overall operation was small unit tactical operations. For example, as the Quarter ended... ROK forces were conducting some 195 small unit operations.
This Korean emphasis was in keeping with the policy in the II Corps Tactical Zone of economy of force in the first quarter of calendar year 1968 and the greater stress on effective defense of cities and installations.
The primary effort in the II Corps Tactical Zone during the first three months of 1969 was directed toward pacification and improvement of the effectiveness of the armed forces of the republic. The Koreans continued to maintain effective control of the central coastal area from Phan Rang in Ninh Thuan Province to the north of Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh Province. All allied forces found enemy base areas and supply caches with increasing frequency. Binh Dinh Province continued to lead all other provinces in number of enemy incidents; however, the majority of reported actions were small unit contacts with generally minor results. Allied units, particularly the Korean force, continued to place great emphasis on small unit operations. The enemy continued to avoid decisive engagements and directed his activity mainly against territorial forces and civilian population centers.
An analysis of Korean cordon and search operations was provided by Lieutenant General William R. Peers, who considered the Koreans to have more expertise in this kind of operation than any of the other forces he had seen in South Vietnam:
There were several key elements in their conduct of this type of operations. First, they are thorough in every detail in their planning. Secondly, their cordon involves a comparatively small area, probably not in excess of 9 or 10 square kilometers for a regimental size force. Third, the maximum force is employed, generally consisting of a regiment up to something in excess of a division. And finally, the operation is rehearsed and critiqued before it is begun. Units are moved into locations around the periphery of the cordon by a variety of means, including helicopters, trucks and by foot, but so timed that all arrive in position simultaneously to complete the encirclement. The density of the troops is such that the distance between individuals on the cordon is less than 10 meters. They leave little opportunity for the enemy to exfiltrate in small numbers. Areas, such as streams and gulleys, are barricaded with barbed wire and other barrier materials, reinforced by troops who may remain in water chest deep over night. The closing of the cordon is very slow and deliberate, not a rock is left unturned or piece of ground not probed. When the area has been cleared, they will surge back and forth through it to flush out any of the remnants. An[other]
