during the period 27-30 January 1967 on various aspects of the pending deployment. In February the commitment of Thai troops was affirmed and on 13 March the unit began training. The Thai contingent would eventually be located with and under the operational control of the 9th U.S. Infantry Division. On 15 March representatives of the Royal Thai Army and U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand, met with the MACV staff to finalize the unit's tables of organization and equipment allowances. Discussions were held also on training, equipage, and deployment matters. The approved table of organization and equipment provided for a regimental combat team (minus certain elements) with a strength of 3,307, a 5 percent overstrength. The staff of the regimental combat team, with its augmentation, was capable of conducting field operations and of securing a base camp. Organizationally, the unit consisted of a headquarters company with a communications platoon, an aviation platoon, an M113 platoon, a psychological operations platoon, a heavy weapons platoon with a machine gun section, and a four-tube 81-mm. mortar section; a service company consisting of a personnel and special services platoon and supply and transport, maintenance, and military police platoons; four rifle companies; a reinforced engineer combat company; a medical company; a cavalry reconnaissance troop of two reconnaissance platoons and an M113 platoon; and a six-tube 105-mm. howitzer battery. On 18 March the approved table of organization and equipment was signed by representatives of MACV and the Royal Thai Army.
During the above discussions, the Royal Thai Army agreed to equip one of the two authorized M113 platoons with sixteen of the Thai Army's own armored personnel carriers (APC's) provided by the Military Assistance Program; the United States would furnish APC's for the remaining platoon. This was necessary because all APC's scheduled through the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1967 were programed to replace battle losses and fill the cyclic rebuild program for U.S. forces. Subsequently, however, the Royal Thai Army re-evaluted its earlier proposal and decided to deploy only the platoon from headquarters company, which was to be equipped with APC's furnished from U.S. project stocks. The platoon of APC's in the reconnaissance troop would not be deployed with Thai-owned APC's. The Royal Thai Army was agreeable to activating the entire platoon and using sixteen of its APC's for training, but insisted on picking up sixteen APC's to be supplied upon the platoon's arrival in South Vietnam. If this was not possible, the Thais did not plan to activate the reconnaissance platoon until the United States made a firm commit[ment]
