provided through the U.S. logistic system.
Class IV, ammunition–all items of ammunition and pyrotechnics–were provided through the U.S. logistical system.
Maintenance through the third echelon was performed by the Philippine group as far as it was able. Equipment maintenance beyond the capacity of the Philippine group or the Vietnamese armed forces was provided by U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Equipment that became unserviceable and too costly to repair either through combat use, fair wear and tear, or other reasonable cause was replaced by the appropriate U.S. or Vietnamese armed forces agency.
Transportation between Vietnam and the Philippines was provided by MACV for members of the Philippine group traveling in connection with Philippine group activities. Movements of personnel and equipment were made under the same conditions and system of priorities that applied to U.S. units. This transportation included such authorized travel as the rotation of Philippine group personnel, recall of personnel to the Philippines, return of the dead, and movement of inspection teams in connection with Philippine group activities. Philippine group transportation facilities were used whenever available.
Other support accorded members of the Philippine Civic Action Group, Vietnam, by the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, consisted of permission to use U.S. mess, billeting, club, religious, exchange, commissary, and mail facilities, and to participate in U.S. military recreation programs.
The United States assisted the Philippine group in recovery of the dead and provided mortuary service. The United States further agreed to the provision of death gratuities for members to be administered along the same general lines as the payment of such gratuities to Korean troops.
As support and training questions were being resolved, General Ernesto S. Mata, chief of staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and nine other officers arrived in Saigon on 20 July 1966 for three days of talk and an inspection tour. In an unpublicized visit, General Mata emphasized to General Westmoreland the feelings of President Marcos about the strength of the Philippine Civic Action Group. Marcos believed that its organic firepower was inadequate, particularly in the areas of automatic weapons, large mortars, and artillery and that the security battalion did not have the armor and could not carry out the armed reconnaissance that was standard in a comparable U.S. unit. He therefore wanted assurance of quick and effective reinforcement from nearby U.S. and South Vietnamese combat elements in case of large-scale attacks on Philippine installations.
