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Notes and Suggestions

"a negative, in all cases whatsoever, on the Legislative acts of the States, as the King of Great Britain heretofore had".[1] Jefferson did not agree with Madison; on practical grounds rather than as a matter of principle, he expressed his preference for some form of judicial control.[2] Madison held, however, to his own opinion and found a considerable support in the convention.

On June 8, while the convention was sitting in committee of the whole, Charles Pinckney made a motion to give the national legislature a negative on all state laws "which to them shall appear improper". He argued in support of this motion, that "under the British Govt. the negative of the Crown had been found beneficial, and the States are more one nation now, than the Colonies were then". Madison was apparently more cautious in his approval of the imperial precedent. He renewed the suggestion made in his letter to Randolph of "some emanation of the power from the Natl. Govt. into each State so far as to give a temporary assent at least". "This", he said, "was the practice in Royal Colonies before the Revolution and would not have been inconvenient, if the supreme power of negativing had been faithful to the American interest and had possessed the necessary information".[3] When the discussion was resumed on July 17, Madison came forward with another speech in support of the congressional veto, again supporting his contention by reference to the royal disallowance of colonial laws:

Its utility is sufficiently displayed in the British System. Nothing could maintain the harmony and subordination of the various parts of the empire, but the prerogative by which the Crown stifles in the birth every Act of every part tending to discord or encroachment. It is true the prerogative is sometimes misapplied thro' ignorance or a partiality to one particular part of the empire: but we have not the same reason to fear such misapplications in our System.[4]

This is almost precisely Jefferson's theory of the legitimate function of an imperial veto.

How many of Madison's colleagues shared his comparatively favorable view of the royal veto it is impossible to say. Apparently only one of his opponents in the debate touched on this particular

  1. Writings, II. 338, 339.
  2. Jefferson, Writings (Ford ed.), IV. 390–391.
  3. Journal, and Madison's Notes, June 8 (Farrand, Records, I.).
  4. Madison's Notes, July 17 (Farrand, Records, II. 28). There are brief references to this aspect of the discussion in Curtis, Constitutional History of the United States, I. 345–347; Coxe, Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation, ch. 34; Robinson, "Original and Derived Features of the Constitution", in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, I. 238; and Bigelow's essay in Cambridge Modern History, vol. VII., ch. VIII.