think of other eventualities—by hypothesis, that we should be forced, in spite of ourselves, to be embroiled with Austria? For such a case, Shuvalov asks, if the triple alliance should proceed to crumble, might it not be replaced by some dual arrangement effected before the explosion should take place? Would it not be possible to obtain some understanding that in these conditions would guarantee us on the side of Austria and her probable allies? At the moment there was in existence a triple agreement and also another alongside it, based on interests common to our two allies. Shuvalov questions whether a third might not be brought into existence, between Germany and ourselves, based on interests concerning us especially; do ut des. The chancellor, having no other thought and desire than the securing of general peace, could hardly refuse combinations which alone could secure him that result.
To this question of Shuvalov, Giers replied, September 14, that the idea of substituting a dual alliance for the triple alliance was a very good one, and was in all points agreeable to the tsar's desire, which was to strengthen in permanent shape our understanding with Germany. But how bring this about? At the beginning of the negotiations which had resulted in the signing of our secret arrangements of 1881, our intention had been to make them with Germany alone. Our object was to guard ourselves against the danger of the coalitions which the complicated execution of the treaty of Berlin threatened at every instant to raise against Russia, and to deprive Great Britain, particularly aggressive at that time, of every ally in case she should decide to make war upon us. On the other hand it was important to us to cause Germany to share our point of view respecting the principle of the closing of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and to lead her to enforce at Constantinople respect for the treaties in which that principle had been embodied.
Germany on her side asked that we should assure her of our neutrality and of the limitation of the conflict in case she should find herself at war with France, and that we should respect the integrity of Austria, provided the latter did not extend her action into the Orient beyond the limits indicated by the treaty of Berlin, unless on previous arrangement with us.
Such had been, on one side and on the other, the fundamental bases of Saburov's negotiations. But Bismarck had speedily declared that it would be difficult for him to enter into the proposed engagements without associating Austria in them, bound as he was to Austria by previous arrangements. The chancellor moreover considered the participation of Vienna in our treaty as very desir-
