Page:American Historical Review, Vol. 23.djvu/48

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38
W. T. Root

lution and not from the adherents of the old order. With the exception of Halifax for a short period, the work fell upon new councillors who had little of that interest and training in matters imperial so distinctive of the advisers of Charles II. Division in the councils of the king was the outcome of William's first policy, like that of Washington a century later, of seeking support from all factions temporarily united by the Revolution. It was a policy destined to fail; once the crisis was passed, Whig and Tory, like Federalist and Republican, became too jealous to co-operate. Halifax, lord privy seal, and Carmarthen, lord president, were at odds, Shrewsbury and Nottingham, secretaries, tried to persuade the king to different courses, and Nottingham and Admiral Russell quarrelled over the direction of the fleet.[1]

Unity was not attained until the king recognized the utility of party support, but in the meantime administration was crippled by faction and by frequent changes in personnel. The fluctuating membership in the council was reflected in the changing personnel of the plantation committee of the whole council. This fault of instability became a striking and serious condition after 1689, when defense loudly demanded cohesion and constancy of power. Some indication of the violent fluctuations in the plantation committee at this time may be gathered from the fact that fifty-nine different councillors attended its meetings at very irregular intervals and uncertain times. Those present at one sitting were likely to be absent or in the minority at the next. A small degree of continuity and balance was lent to the working of the committee during 1689-1696 by the fairly regular attendance of Carmarthen, Sir Henry Goodricke, lieutenant-general of ordnance, Hugh Boscawen, one of the admiralty board, and John Egerton, third earl of Bridgewater.[2] Incompetence, factionalism, and change worked their weakening effects throughout the executive government, from the council to the departments and offices of administration.

Colonial protection was poor enough, but commerce on the high seas suffered disastrously.[3] Large and constant were the

  1. Burnet, Hist. Own Time, pp. 550–551, 580, 585; Evelyn, Diary, January 3, February 4, November 12, 1693; Foxcroft, Halifax, vol. 11., ch. XII.
  2. Under James II., out of thirty-four different councillors who attended the plantation committee, only three were present at more than fifty per cent. of the total number of meetings. Under William III., forty-nine attended with records varying from two to fifty sessions, six from fifty to ninety sessions; while Goodricke was present at seventy-two per cent. of the total sessions, Carmarthen sixty per cent., Bridgewater forty per cent., and Boscawen thirty-six.
  3. Cal. St. P., Col., 1689–1692, pp. xxvii–xxxvi; 1693–1696, pp. viii–xii. xxix–xliv, for a résumé of colonial protection.