In his letter Sir Harry Parkes stated that he and his colleagues would demand "a prompt and satisfactory settlement of the questions referred to", and emphasized the importance of securing the formal approval of the treaties by the Mikado, while he closed with the suggestive statement that he was accompanied by Admiral King, commander-in-chief of all the naval forces of Her Britannic Majesty in China and Japan, and that his letter was dated from the admiral's flag-ship.[1]
Of course there were no "questions of grave importance" arising out of the Convention of 1864. The Japanese had paid the first installment of the indemnity almost a year before it was due, and they had asked for a delay of a few months in making the second payment. But this request was used as a lever for forcing certain concessions which the treaty powers desired. And the pressure was applied at a most opportune time, for Japan was threatened with civil war because of the Choshiu complications.
In a conference between Abe Bungo-no-Kami and the foreign representatives, on the 11th, it was pointed out that the opening of Hiogo and Osaka had been postponed only on certain conditions as set forth in the London Protocol of 1862, that the conditions had not been kept by Japan, and that hence Great Britain could insist upon the immediate opening of the port and city.[2] Also, the powers would insist upon the punctual payment of the indemnity. Therefore it would be better for the Shogun to grant the three demands of the powers—that Hiogo and Osaka be immediately opened, that the formal consent of the Mikado to the treaties be obtained, that the tariff be reduced to a five per cent. basis—in return for the remission of two-thirds of the indemnity.[3]
Lord Abe agreed that the Shogun had not been able to carry out the conditions of the London Protocol, but explained the difficulties under which he labored and craved the indulgence of the powers. He also maintained that the opening of Hiogo and Osaka was out of the question at the present time, whereupon the ministers replied that if the Shogun would not open Hiogo then the powers might insist upon it under the treaties of 1858, and it was even suggested that there was nothing in the treaties to prevent them from opening trade with the daimyos at their own ports. This was an indefensible position, taken to frighten the Shogunate into submis-
