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302 A British Officer to Lady smith, ^ written by the brilliant pen of Steevens, a man be- loved alike by soldier and journalist, who had the rare gift of com- bining in his word-pictures accuracy of statement with color and life. The other narratives of the three first weeks in Natal with their brilliant little actions of Talana and Elandslaagte, the retarding fight at Reitfontein, the skilful retreat from Dundee, the mournful Monday of Lombard's Kop and Nicholson's Nek, and of the four long months during which Sir George White held the main Boer army at bay have hardly received full justice at the hands of the able journalists who witnessed them. A siege is trying to all who are in the inner circle, but for war correspondents, whose duty it is to keep the public informed from day to day of the progress of operations, the bad luck of being cut ofif for the third of a year from the outer world, save for such precarious means of communication as pigeons and runners, was .the most cruel of misfortunes. Im- perceptibly the disappointment, the strain of doing nothing when they desired to be most active, overshadowed their spirits and in a manner warped their judgment. The hardships of the siege are fully set out in their narratives, but the strategic value of keeping the iiag flying, of containing the main striking force of the republics, and thus covering directly southern Natal, and indirectly Cape Colony, was not grasped or appreciated. Of the popular narratives dealing with the relief of Ladysmith, The Natal Campaign by Bennet Burleigh^ and London to Ladysmith via Pretoria by Winston Churchill' are the most valuable. Mr. Bennet Burleigh has a high reputation as a war correspondent; he has witnessed much fighting in every quarter of the globe, and can be trusted to put down frankly and truthfully what he sees and hears. That in common with nearly all his brethren of the pen he fails to display knowledge of the higher branches of the great game of war is hardly surprising, for, although the national judg- ment is much influenced by the reports of the press representatives from the seat of war. the need of systematically training such guides to public opinion in the performance of their responsible duties has not yet been accepted in democratic communities. Yet not only does the professional future of commanders of armies at times depend on popular verdicts hastily formed under such amateur guidance, but the force of public oiMuion at home, directed into wrong channels, not infrequently exercises an unfortunate influence ■over the conduct of operations in the field. ' London and New York, 1900. ' London, 1900. ' London, 1900.