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3i6 A British Officer ever its historical merits, will live for many generations. But both for soldier and for historian this alone does not suffice. For them the crucial tests are, first, accuracy in statement of fact and, secondly, a right judgment in the inferences to be drawn from the facts. As regards the first test, accuracy, the two volumes differ much in merit. The second, dealing with the earliest phases of the war, was brought out somewhat rapidly with the object of achieving a large sale before the interest of the general public had begun to fade. Its writers moreover did not quite realize the length of time needed for historical researches. They labored moreover under the serious disadvantage of going to press before the Report of the Royal Com- mission was published, thus missing much important material. For these reasons the second volume cannot be accepted as a satisfactory record of the events of the campaign down to the battle of Colenso Its very wealth of detail is the more dangerous as serving to con- ceal imperfect knowledge and inaccurate statements. The third volume is free from such blemishes. There are slips here and there, but on the whole the two years' longer labor expended on it have enabled the writers to attain a degree of accuracy very superior to that displayed in the second. But in history of every description, and especially military his- tory, facts are in one sense unimportant. What really matters are the lessons to be drawn from the facts, and in a secondary degree the judgments to be pronounced on individuals. Weighed in this balance with each other, the second and third volumes are by no means even, and yet both have in common a grave defect, the over- severity which characterizes the criticism of an amateur who has mastered the jargon of a science and some of the science, but does not appreciate the difficulty of its technique. In the second volume this over-severity is so marked a feature as to be not only a grave injustice to individuals but even a distortion of the whole historical focus of the campaign. Sir George White, for instance, is criticized with a certain contemptuous air of superior knowledge for not having sent away his cavalry before the siege of Lady smith, and for not having increased the fourteen miles of his line of defense to twenty by the inclusion therein of Bulwana Mountain. No pro- fessional soldier would have perpetrated such a blunder as to place side by side two criticisms which are mutually self-destructive. If the cavalry had been sent out of Ladysmith, the force left would have been inadequate to hold the line of defense. Its curtailment, not enlargement, would have been instantly forced on the general in command, and no curtailment was possible without surrendering