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Weeden : War Goveniuienf, Federal and State 409 liancy ; though it must be confessed that a striving for epigram and fine writing, together with defective organization of material, are among the faults of the book. As a business man Mr. Weeden finds it difficult to deal patiently with the short-sighted and unbusinesslike policies which characterized the early stages of the war, and frequent use is made of such terms as " official astigmatism ", " bureaucratic obscurantism ", " bureau miasma ". In particular, the federal administration is censured severely for not accepting all the troops offered by the loyal governors in 1861 and 1862. Even Lincoln is not spared; for while justice is done to his " wise and far-seeing action " in the use of his " reserved preroga- tives " (which, with frequent insistence, are derived from the office of king), of his general executive action the author says(p. 68): "He could not execute in the largest sense by care that ' foresees, provides, administers ' affairs. Great as his motive might be, his interference in the bureaus became petty and pernicious. Any woman weeping in the White House could get an order pardoning a sentinel for sleeping on post. But that order would cost hundreds or thousands of lives." And again (p. 144) : " If Abraham Lincoln had had something more of the same Napoleonic power of action [as Governor Morton, of Indiana], it would have been a great boon to the American executive." For the work accomplished by Governors Andrew of Massachusetts, Curtin of Pennsylvania, Morgan of New York, and Morton of Indiana he has in the main only words of praise; the governors of the great com- monwealths he styles " the only war-ministers the country had or could have, until the pressure of affairs developed Stanton" (p. 74). In his characterization of Morgan (p. 222) we have an excellent comparison of the abilities of the four men : Morgan " perhaps . . . was the best plain executive officer of the four . . . He could not govern, in the sense that ]Iorton and Andrew could forelay state action, or Curtin could carry a whole people through his innate energy. But no one better directed the legitimate forces of the State by official prerogative than did Morgan." On the other hand, the author's contempt and condemnation are outspoken for " Copperheads " and the " dawdling Northern Demo- crats who vainly tried to build a new fjarty out of their country's agony ". Equally trenchant is his criticism of Northern radicals like 'endell Phillips, whom he styles (p. 149) "a political imbecile of the worst sort ", who " lived in a sublimated, vitriolic atmosphere that common patriots could not breathe and assimilate ". Many of Mr. Weeden's characterizations and criticisms are shrewd and to the point, showing real insight into the problems of that troublous time and independence of thought in his estimates of men and measures. His judgments, however, are usually impressionistic, and not based on ordered evidence and argument; and where they differ from those, say, of Mr. Rhodes (as in his estimate of the course of the administration with reference to Vallandigham), they fail to carry conviction. The work, in short, is not of monographic character, but is rather a series of