Canning and the SpanisJi Patriots in 1808 45 supreme authority and the exercise of power are unwilling to become the mere organ through whom the orders of a superior body shall be executed. The satisfaction of providing for dependents and relations has likewise biassed many very patriotic men, and induces them to find out specious arguments in favour of their own provinces, though pre- judicial to the general interests of the State. Every Junta desires that the Cortez shall be established near their own firesides [sic'], and many, anxious to retain their consequence, wish to increase the number of deputies from their provinces sufficiently to depute every member of their own body to that assembly, and thus, by incorporating themselves in the national representation, to retain their power. Stuart then states that innumerable jealousies had arisen from these causes, and he advises that His Majesty's government should remonstrate with the Spanish deputies in London and insist on the speedy union of the Cortes, and suggest also that the assembly of that body besides causing the formal recognition of the independence of the whole peninsula might operate to induce H. M.'s Government to contribute much more efficaciously to their assistance. I have written to the principal people in every province which has any communication with this place to urge very strongly the necessity of union and a supreme government. I not only spoke fully to the Junta on the subject, but gave them my arguments in writing.' He then states that there was much heat and violence of feel- ing at Corunna, but that finally the bishop of Orense had agreed to join the junta of Galicia. The French were, however, very weak, their chief force being at Burgos. It was now suggested that British troops should land at Santander, but Stuart thought this dangerous, as it was too near to France and the Spaniards were too full of divisions to afford much help. He continues : The Asturians have in vain asked for artillery from the depots in Gallicia: and the Stores landed at Gihon and not used by the Asturians, have remained at that port and in Oviedo, altho' they would have afforded a seasonable relief to the army of Genl. Blake. . . . The French have omitted no offer to tempt the ambition and corrupt the integrity of the patriotic leaders: besides the letter to Genl. Blake, they have addressed every other person invested with command. Marshal Bessieres offered Genl. Cuesta the vice-royalty of the Mexico if he would consent to abandon the cause he had espoused ; the latter however did not con- descend to return an answer to the proposal. ... It is most lucky that the division of the French force has kept pace with the division of their opponents ; their losses must have taught them, however, that they were in error; and they appear now to be about to adopt a contrary system: if therefore these people do not unite their political and military means, and teach their men to act in great bodies, it will not be easy for them to maintain the advantages they have so fortunately gained. Having in some degree moderated the dissensions among them, I daily enlarge on the necessity of attention to their federal interests ; but the province
Page:American Historical Review, Volume 12.djvu/55
This page needs to be proofread.
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b2/American_Historical_Review%2C_Volume_12.djvu/page55-1024px-American_Historical_Review%2C_Volume_12.djvu.jpg)