Page:American Historical Review, Volume 12.djvu/602

592 Documents sense of the Senate by the shapes of speech which may be chosen, it will be immediately detected; and in the certainty that the sense of the Senate will be expressed, unless there be a wilfull departure from it; which would amount to a cause of impeachment, would avail nothing in fact, and is not to be presumed. — 4. As to the length of time before- hand, which my doctrine would allow to the Senate ; the restriction would be this: if the President was once to pass his judgment upon it. whether in the negative or affirmative, the subject would be immediately ended; or if before he had passed his judgment upon it. a future Senate should by a vote of two thirds annul the preceding vote, it would be constitutionall)' abolished. So that the power of a succeeding Senate need never be supposed in danger. From these considerations, I con- clude, that the President may ratify without submitting the new article to the Senate. If these difficulties shall be cleared away in the President's mind, he will next arrive at the two great and momentous questions: i. Whether to ratify, as the Senate have advised, or reject: 2. and what line of con- duct is to be pursued, in either event. I. The reasons for ratifying or rejecting have often passed thro' his mind; but as it will aid me in my own conclusions, to bring the principal of those reasons into one summary view, I beg leave to offer this concise statement. A treaty is the act of two independent nations; neither having a right to dictate to the other ; and each determining upon what it will yield or accept, partly from its sense of right ; partly upon its own strength, and partly upon the inferiority and actual situation of its an- tagonist. Compare the U States and Great Britain together; and war from us would appear formidable to her no otherwise, than as it would interrupt her trade and manufactures. These being the only avenues through which G. Britain, as a nation, could have been really wounded by us, she went into the negotiation with no other apprehension of us, unless it might have been, that the supplies for the West Indies would be withholden. To counterpoise this, she calculated upon our aversion to war, founded upon our true policy: she was conscious of her own ability to enter into any commercial reprisals upon us; and understood the temper of our people too well to believe, that they would have long foreborne from the fruits of neutrality for the indulgence of national hatred. We know, that at one period the british ministry would have made war upon us •} her losses and our sincere neutrality perhaps changed this hostile disposition; but she must have been perfectly per- suaded, that we could stipulate nothing in her favour, wch. could re- lieve her from present difficulties in the war with France. Under these circumstances, what kind of a treaty could we expect ? Not one dictated by ourselves ; nor yet one, different from all that have ever been made on such occasions, on principles of compromize and mu- ' See Jay to Washington, July 21, 1794. Corresfoiidciice of John Jay, IV. 33.