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1 60 Rcvicics of Books struction of the Maine," although most observers of our country at that period commented upon the restraint the country put upon itself, and the dignified and deliberate action of our government with reference to it. It thus appearing that the author has certainly no bias in favor of the Americans, we may look upon his ultimate statement concerning the Maine as devoid of prejudice. This statement is as follows : " still it does seem to the author to have established the probability that the Maine was destroyed by a mine." Referring to the strength of the two fleets the author has given a very clear statement of the tonnage, guns, and armor of our navy and that of Spain. It is, however, in comparing the spirit and training of the personnel of the two fleets, American and Spanish, that he shows the clear discernment which has been his chief merit as a critical writer. The second chapter of this work, especially the latter portion of the chapter, which treats of questions of morale and discipline, is well worth reading for its clear and forcible presentation of facts relative to crews and officers of both navies. In discussing " the plan of operations in the West," which is the title of Chapter III., the author makes natural de- ductions from the reports that were to be obtained. His judgment of the Spanish plans, or lack of them, is very clear and goes to the bottom of the situation. There is something pathetic in his comments on page 98 upon Cervera, his valor above reproach, his chivalry and tenderness of heart, winning for him the admiration even of his enemies. His asser- tion, however, that Cervera was by nature despondent and a pessimist, and that he in character and temperament resembled Villeneuve, is open to question, as being unjust to Cervera. Villeneuve commanded great fleets out of which much might have been made by an admiral of resolu- tion, in the long period during which he commanded them. But it is doubtful whether any commander, even if he possessed proper energy, could have done anything in the time given to Cervera, with such a force as was at his disposal. To Judge Cervera correctly, we should have to know what he knew of the spirit of his subordinates. Sound strategy and daring tactics are useless if the fighting spirit does not permeate the fleet or army concerned, and it does not appear that the Spaniards under Cervera's command, though brave seamen and gallant officers, had that fighting spirit. Those who served against them in Santiago and Porto Rico were, I think, united in this opinion. Xo love of war for war's sake was observable, no vigor of initiative, on the contrary a profound apathy, a brave but melancholy acquiescence in the decrees of an unkind fate. No more gallant gentlemen, however, are found in the world than the group of officers whose parole the writer took on the quarter-deck of the Indiana as his prisoners on the afternoon of the great battle ; nor could one have wished to see a more dignified and noble attitude than that of Admiral Cervera at the close of the battle, when first a prisoner in our hands. The writer believes that if Cervera could have been certain of his ships and their equipment, could have felt that his officers and men were yearning after desperate and sanguinary battle, he himself would