Marriage, exemplifies a tendency of deep import in current ethical writings; the tendency, namely, to study moral concepts in the light of history and ethnology, and to regard moral acts and judgments from the standpoint of the science of mind. The work arose from the queries: 'Whence the agreement and difference among moral ideas?' and 'Why moral ideas at all?' Westermarck has sought the answer, not in a priori argument, but in a first-hand analysis of the moral consciousness as it comes to expression in human conduct at large.
Moral judgments rest upon 'moral' emotions, and moral concepts refer to the tendency in certain phenomena to elicit these emotions. The establishment of morals upon an emotive basis calls, of course, for a differential description of the moral consciousness. This is a difficult task. The author enters upon it as follows: Moral emotions are either of approval or disapproval. Both are species of 'retribution,' which includes also non-moral forms of 'resentment' and 'gratitude.' The common element in all resentment (i. e., moral and non-moral disapproval) is "an aggressive attitude of mind towards an assumed cause of pain," and in all 'kindly retributive' emotion, "a friendly attitude of rnind towards a cause of pleasure." The moral forms, now, are marked by (1) disinterestedness, (2) impartiality, and (3) generality. Both for the survival of moral emotions and for their origin, Westermarck has a teleological explanation. Hostility toward the cause of pain and retributive friendliness toward the cause of pleasure are useful; they tend "to promote the interests of those who feel them." The origin of the distinctively moral qualities of emotion is social; the emotion is disinterestsd, impartial, and generalized, because the situation is public. That is, it concerns custom; it is tribal; and it reflects a social rule of conduct.
As an account of the origin of morality, the argument appears to move in a circle. "As the rule of custom is a moral rule, the indignation aroused by its transgression is naturally a moral emotion;" but "custom is a moral rule only on account of the indignation called forth by its transgression." At most, the argument proves that morality is very old, and that its essential characteristics are discoverable in primitive tribal customs. Moreover, in the moral consciousness the primacy of the emotion (as against the 'judgment') is only partially established; for it is to be noticed that all the qualities that are properly 'moral' (see above) are not, in fact, emotive in their nature. Really, in order to make his point, Westermarck should have gone deeper and given an analytic description of the observer's consciousness, instead of giving as he actually does the observer's 'moral' opinion of an act or situation. Possibly this is asking too much in the present condition of the psychology of the emotions. If the analysis had been made, however, the author might conceivably have discovered that pleasure and pain are not the only objects of approval and resentment, and, further, that the moral consciousness is as much conative as emotive.
His method in the study of moral concepts is more effective. It endeavors "to fix the true import of each concept by examining how, and under what circumstances, the term expressing it is generally applied," and it tends to show that the concepts "are all fundamentally derived from either moral indignation or moral approval." With Chapter vii begins the most valuable part of the work; the scrutiny, namely, of the "mass of phenomena which, among different peoples and in differenr ages, have had a tendency to call forth moral blame and moral praise." The sources are customs and laws. The chapters which discuss the relation of custom and law to ethics, and those
