We incline to the latter view, though we regard the kinæsthetic support as a contributing factor.
Finally, we wish to emphasize the point that our results, positive as they are, hold at present only for the conditions under which they were obtained and for the observers upon whose introspections they rest. Any attempt at generalization would be premature. We have found that imagination is distinguished from memory by sensory vividness; but it may be that this vividness is not essential to imagination, and in any case it does not mark off imagination from pictorial thought. We have not found that imagination is in general more markedly emotive than memory; but, under other circumstances, this may prove to be the case. We have not found that imagination implies a plan, a voluntary synthesis; yet it may do so in other cases. We have dealt only with two complexes, of a low degree of complication, which had the advantage that they were easily manageable, that they were promptly distinguished by our observers, though at first in non-psychological terms, and that their distinction is definitely of the kind that, in the text-books, separates memory from imagination. Even if our results are verified by other investigators, the great bulk of the chapter on the Experimental Psychology of Imagination remains to be written.
