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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY.

case it would appear as if the two parties became de facto unmarried; since their union is broken, both in its physical and its psychical aspects, they are no longer one flesh, nor is theirs a community of love. They are not, therefore, forbidden by Jesus to marry again.[1]

But two things are here very evident: (1) Jesus does not command a divorce even in the most extreme cases. His recognition of the possibility of such a course of action is, so to speak, parenthetic. The ideal of brotherhood and the need of reconciliation would certainly favor a maintenance of old relations even after divorce is permissible. Forgiveness and reconciliation are as much the supreme needs in the family as at the altar. (2) There is nothing in his teachings that would lead us to believe Jesus disapproved of the separation of a married pair for other causes than the one which would justify divorce. But remarriage on the part of either husband or wife who are thus separated would be regarded by him as a violation of the marriage union that still exists between them.

    10:11, although Meyer may be correct in saying that it is there understood as a matter of course. It is also lacking in Luke 16:18, but the omission by Luke is not so serious as that by Mark. Wendt (Teaching of Jesus, I., 354) judges this omission as sufficient ground for the view that "the simple, unqualified statement 'to put away a wife on the ground of unchastity is not culpable adultery,' does not correspond with the meaning of Jesus." This meaning being "that the obligation of marriage is absolute, and no dissolution of it is possible without incurring the guilt of adultery." And it must be admitted that on critical grounds the addition of the clause by Matthew (so Bleek, Weiss, Holtzmann, and others) is more probable than its omission by Mark. Yet on the grounds stated in the text the exception does not appear foreign to the thought of Jesus. Even were the clause omitted, we should have very possibly a strong rhetorical statement like others of Jesus. (For example. Matt. 5:29, 30, 34.) And in any case the main thought of Jesus would be unaffected. An interesting commentary upon his position is to be seen in the interpretation put by Jesus upon the status of the much married Samaritan woman, John 4:18.

  1. See Hovey, The Scriptural Law of Divorce, and Studies in Ethics and Religion, p. 321 sq., and commentaries (especially Meyer, and Broadus) on the above passages. See also Strong, Philosophy and Religion, 431–442, and Woolsey, Divorce and Divorce Legislation, ch. 2, although so far as his interpretation of the teaching of Jesus on this point is concerned. President Woolsey's views were later reversed. (See the essay by President Strong just mentioned.) The church has not generally favored this interpretation. See Schmidt, Social Results of Christianity, p. 201 sq., and, especially for the Roman Catholic position, Convers, Marriage and Divorce.