METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS IN SOCIOLOGY
II
In the first part of this paper there has been an attempt to show that description, generalization, and purely physical causa- tion i. e., the method of the physical sciences when applied to the data of sociology, to the exclusion of every other method, will give inadequate results. The element of appreciation which is characteristic of metaphysical investigation was deemed to be necessary owing to the nature of the units and the sort of causa- tion involved, etc. Furthermore, the contention was made, on general grounds, that sociology ought to, and in many cases where it gives an adequate explanation of the facts does, introduce an element of appreciation; or, in other words, a metaphysical element.
It is our purpose in this part to take up some of the most characteristic conceptions of the sociology of the present day, and to examine them with a view toward determining whether or not they involve the metaphysical element contended for in the first part.
The first sociological principle to be considered is " conscious- ness of kind," advanced by Professor Giddings in his Principles of Sociology, Elements of Sociology, and papers published in various ways. In his Principles of Sociology he defines "con- sciousness of kind " as " a state of consciousness in which any being, whether high or low in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself." 1 In his Elements of Sociology, a later work, he has changed this definition so that it reads thus : " The consciousness of kind, then, is that pleasurable state of mind which includes organic sympathy, the perception of resemblance, conscious or reflective sympathy, affection, and the desire for recognition." 2 This definition is repeated without
1 Principles of Sociology (New York, 1896), p. 17. 1 Elements of Sociology (New York, 1898), p. 66.
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