Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 10.djvu/531

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METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS IN SOCIOLOGY $ l 5

The complete realization of the social consciousness in which the agencies of the self and not-self become mutually inclusive, is a consummation in which the dynamic consciousness is transcended, and the principle of comprehension

is reached in the intuition of the aesthetic consciousness It is in this

aesthetic experience that the subject's self-intuition completes itself."

Getting behind a small detail in terminology, we see the funda- mental similarity, though the former would hardly care to admit the implications which the latter expresses. It brings out, how- ever, an important consideration in the argument for the presence of appreciation in the principle. It is here also that the worth- element, which we have seen is appreciative, would appear in consciousness of kind.

Consciousness of kind is further said to be the " perception of resemblance." But it is more than this when we come to examine it. Certain differences between ourselves and others are felt or perceived. We should have no sense of our own individuality as apart from the others, if we had only this perception of resem- blance and nothing else. There must be some consciousness of some central point of departure for the judgment of resemblance. There must, furthermore, be reflection upon this perception of identity behind difference. Take an anthropoid ape, for example ; man will not have any consciousness of kind with it. But why not ? The ape has many similarities of bodily structure, he walks upright, and so on. As to his mental make-up, he imitates with ease human actions which it would be impossible for any other sort of animal to imitate; there is a great display of affection by the simian mother toward her offspring ; she embraces it as would a human mother ; and so, why is there no consciousness of kind ? It will be answered that reflection upon such similarities and differences would never bring a consciousness of kind, since that almost intangible feeling which seems to be present in conscious- ness of kind, as found in the human mind, would be absent ; and then, too, the resemblances are not sufficiently exact. When asked what is the criterion upon which is based the judgment of insuffi- ciency, the judgment will be found to be based largely upon the principle of sufficient reason; i. e., the criterion by which the

  • Op. cit., p. 252.