Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 2.djvu/167

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NO TES AND ABSTRA CTS 153

accord but was destroyed by the state throughout Europe, and many traces of communal possessions still remain. Along with these persist great numbers of mutual aid habits and customs, especially in continental Europe. These possess great economical value, but a greater ethical value. The recent rapid extension of agricultural syndicates in France, similar associations in Germany, village communities and peasant associa- tions in Russia, similai institutions among the less civilized people of Asia and Africa all attest the very general importance of such institutions. The nucleus of mutual support institutions, habits and customs remains alive with the millions ; and they prefer to cling to their customs, beliefs, traditions rather than accept the teachings of a war of each against all, which are offered to them under the title of science, but form no science at all. (PRINCE KROPOTKIN, in The Nineteenth Century, January 1896.)

Social Evolution. The complexity of social life among human beings sug- gests that biological conceptions cannot without criticism and perhaps modification be applied to social phenomena In every period the prevalent notion of what con- stitutes scientific treatment depends upon what happens to be the predominant sci- ence of the time. The socioliogist must not assume that there are no other factors in social evolution than in organic evolution, nor that natural selection means the same thing in human society that it does among plants and animals. Industrial and com mercial competition is far more closely analogous to the struggle for existence in the organic world than is a war between nations. War has been a more important factor than industrial competition in producing social organisms, as distinct from mere aggregates. It is not only through slow and deadly natural selection that the various elements of civilization have been produced and preserved. Many elements are transmitted by social inheritance, not by heredity in the biological sense. Conscious- ness and reflection may result from natural selection, but once orginated they often lead to supplementing or supplanting natural selection by artificial selection. A habit, which otherwise could disappear only with the extinction of all individuals practicing it, may be changed without the extinction of the race.

Kidd's assumption that religion is what induces individuals to subordinate their interests to those of the social organism is solely a deduction from the general theory of natural selection. If what exists everywhere is due to natural selection, and there- fore furthers social utility, reason must serve the same purpose here ascribed to reli- gion. But Kidd regards reason as antagonistic to social interests. Independent of and prior to all religious sanctions there is a social instinct. Under conditions of modern life, in proportion as religions remain uninfluenced by rationalism they become sources of national weakness, not of strength.

In social evolution the transmission of a type of civilization may become more diffused because more fitted to survive in the struggle for existence with other types of civilization. The assimilative power of national civili/ation maybe more impor- tant than numerical increase of the race. Natural selection cannot be humanized by the altruistic sentiment without ceasing to produce the survival of the fittest. The difficulty in the way of adopting rational artificial selection arises mainly from non-rational religious sentiment \e equal social opportunities and avoid

deterioration of the race, we must have socialistic organi/ation f in<ii:.-t:v and a sys- tem of artificial selection. (DAVID (i. RITCHIE in International Journal of Ethics. January 1896. Philadelphia.

Programme of a Course in Sociology. Hy MARCKI. HKRNKS. Two lead- ing articles in the I\?~-n<- Internationale <ie Sociologi* for December 1895 an d January 1896. The former article is notable chiefly for its clear delimitation of society as a rdial and unique reality, and thus a proper object of < mainder of first

article acutely criticises numerous misconceptions of the relation of societary to ante- cedent phenomena , l>ut misconception- likrlv to bother beginners rather than proper interpretations of the fundamental concep iature contrmp-

The second article reaches the conclusion that the proper r.-ntent of sociology falls into three divisions: (i) Analysis of social solidarity as a fact of present knowledge, a real fact of consciousness as reality reaching beynn<l the individual : collective or