THE CRITERION OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE.
THE problem of the relation of the moralist to the subject- matter of political economy has occasioned the shedding of much ink, and yet it is at bottom a comparatively simple one. In so far as the economist attempts to state the laws which, as a matter of fact, at any given time underlie the process of produc- tion and distribution, the intrusion of the moralist into his field is as impertinent as it would be for him to thrust himself into the councils of the geologist or the biologist. With the attempt to understand, judgments of approbation or reprobation have absolutely nothing to do. But political economy is something more than a science, it is also an art. In this capacity it aims to serve as a guide to legislation and perhaps even to private initiative in marking out the channels in which the stream of industry should flow; in other words, it sets before us ideals and attempts to point out the means by which these may be attained. Here the presence of the moralist is emphatically demanded, for these ideals and the means suggested for their attainment must submit to be measured by ethical standards on pain of forfeiting the allegiance of the best members of society ; and that the untrained and unaided common conscience is incompetent for this complicated task will, we hope, be apparent before the con- clusion of this paper. The contributions of ethics to economics will fall into two divisions ; first, a general statement of the principal demands which morality makes upon all forms of human activity, and, second, a criticism from this point of view of such particular legislative and other innovations as the economist may from time to time propose.
Of all the ethical conceptions with which the economist is compelled to deal, none stand so imperatively in need of clearing up as does that everyday term justice. The present industrial system is constantly the object of bitter attacks because of the
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