METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL PROBLEM 247
ment of the will, the constitution of xht feelings, the connection between them and other facts of consciousness — all these are separate problems of expe- rience, not less than the phenomena of heat and light or groups of his- torical events. Metaphysics is no more and no less demanded in system- atizing the one sort of phenomena than the other.
It must not be forgotten, however, that, for reasons already noted, psychol- ogy must necessarily form a sort of intermediate territory between the natural and the psychical sciences. In much of its work the methods of natural science will be applicable. In other parts the view points of psychical science will fix the fundamental rules. In consequence of this close relationship to both natural science and psychical science, special psychological sciences have already developed as mediators on the one side or the other. Thus, psycho-physics or physiological psychology is concerned with the reciprocal relations of corporeal and psychical processes, while folk-psychology deals with such facts as language, customs, etc., which grow out of the association of many individuals in closer or more comprehensive unities. In this (LOTiX\^z- \.\on pedagogy must be named. Its basis is almost entirely psychological. Its aims, however, are ethical, and its material is found In every science.
We have, then, these general psychical sciences which we may properly call the psychological sciences. Then the special psychical sciences so often mentioned, viz., history, philosophy, jurisprudence, economics, etc. The latter are concerned with certain phases of psychical development, or with certain psychical products. They consider these either in their general relations or in particular historical or ethnological isolation. There inevitably arises between them meanwhile a reciprocal relationship, which as yet is barely recognized, between these special researches and general psychological disciplines, notably folk-psychology. The more special researches bring material for the more general, while the latter help to make interpretation of the former possible.
In classifying the special psychical sciences we may adopt either of two points of view. First, we may follow the example of natural science in distin- guishing and separating processes from objects. Natural sciences are accord- ingly (a) explanatory (physics) or {b) descriptive (zoology). We should have, then, among the psychical sciences [a) the historical, or narrative, and {h) the systematic, or those that attempt to interpret. Or, second, we may start with the view that the subject-matter of the psychical sciences is partly fugitive phenomena, in the shape of passing incidents, partly correlations that are relatively permanent, and may thus be regarded as components of a general societary condition. The former of these modes of division may be the more logical. The latter is closer to practical requirements. Existing sciences easily conform to it. Each systematic discipline has its historical parts.
Accordingly, it is best at present to divide the special psychical sciences into two great classes of (a) historical (genetic) sciences and {b) societary
