REVIEIVS 535
nomena." Both the second and third divisions are teeming with intellectual power and knowledge, especially with unerringly applied knowledge of the natural sciences. The latter, especially in regard to Weismann's theory of heredity, will be very suggestively turned to account in the founding of a sociology.
Ratzenhofer's ontological digressions, based upon his pantheistic world-philosophy, we pass without comment. They are, and perhaps will always remain, speculative postulates of the same doubtful value as those of a theistic world-philosophy. Besides, Ratzenhofer's onto- logical speculation remains no capstone on the sociological structure, but is followed out in its consequences. It has certainly neither con- vinced us in its major proposition of the primitive force, and of its differentiation in creation, even up to social creation, nor has it con- vinced us with its wealth of deduction derived for special "sociological knowledge." However, let the reader here judge for himself.
A presentation of the author's view of the " unity of biological and sociological evolution" — a unity toward which the whole discussion of the first and second divisions is aimed — will be most objectively given, if we quote the following passages from the concluding remarks of the third division (p. 117): "An essential reason why sociological intelligence has so long delayed to recognize a unity of law for biology and sociology has its roots in the apparent freedom of movement of social elements in comparison with cells {biopkores) in the organism. The cell apparently belongs permanently to the organism ; it comes, it goes, with the individual, and is not, like the elements of society, able to change its association, or to belong to several structures. This possibility, despite the concession of unity of law, lies, above all, in the fact that a unitary origin from primitive force belongs to both organic and social structures. If an organism evolves itself from the germ, in accordance with its innate interest, it stands forthwith, in relation to the outer world, individualized and isolated. In this con- dition of life it is able neither to fulfill the destiny of its species nor to preserve itself. Since propagation is, as it were, an extension of the individual beyond his own bodily substance, innate interest forces the individual to enter into relationships beyond his sphere of bodily sensibility, and thus to form social ties in association with individuals having related interests; this is likewise an extension of the indi- vidual beyond the limit of his bodily interests. The same interest which evolves a creature somatically, and then mentally, renders social relations also necessary to it ; for, otherwise, the creature leaves its
