8 14 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
that they can intelligently plan their common activity."' In another place he says: "There must be .... a perception by each of the cooperating individuals that .... all have the same interest, and that all are endeavoring to accomplish the same end."" These statements of Professor Giddings involve, we believe, a correct definition of the term "cooperation" in its usual acceptation. But the large amount of consciousness which they imply on the part of cooperating individuals is just what is often noticeably absent in that acting together of the members of a group which we have called the social coordina- tion. So far from being conscious of any purpose or end, the individual is usually in group-activities unconscious of the con- nection of his act either with his own life-process or with that of the group. He is conscious, if at all, generally only of the gratification or working out of an instinctive impulse. Espe- cially among lower forms the end which controls the activity cannot be supposed to exist for the consciousness of the form. Consciousness of the task to be performed, of the end to be reached, in the acting together of members of a group would seem to be the exception rather than the rule, if we take into view the group-life of the whole organic world ; while conscious- ness of the "acting together" as a definite means to an end is a still rarer phenomenon. The psychical attitude which social coordination involves (where consciousness exists) on the part of the coordinated individuals is not a consciousness of "acting together," or even of a definite task to be performed, but rather a feeling or sense of relationship to one another. The social coordination, in other words, comes into consciousness only at a relatively late period in mental development, and then only when some new condition necessitates the reconstruction of the coordination. It is evident, then, that if the term "cooperation" is used to cover all cases of social coordination, it must be used wholly in an objective sense and must be stripped of its usual implication of consciousness. If used in this sense, there is no objection to saying, as Spencer does, "Social life in its entirety
'Elements of Sociology, p. 77. 'Il/id.,^. 78.
