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being either a sensation or a perception, from which the subse- quent acts follow as reflex actions. One of the characteristics of instinctive acts is that they pass from the automatic sphere to the volitional sphere, and conversely: the stimulus that in instinctive acts affects the organism through sensation or per- ception only, produces in volitional acts a series of mental phenomena — sensation, perception, memory, imagination — which finally culminate in the determination of the will and the voluntary and purposive performance of those acts. It is to be remarked that, owing to a mode of expression, due in part to our analogical manner of conceiving things and events, and in part to a survival of the old teleological methods and theories, we usually speak of instincts as being subservient to special ends or purposes ; and when the instinctive act becomes an intelligent act, these special ends or purposes come to be recognized as the direct objects of volition : they become the motives of the will. The so-called instinct of self-preservation, for instance, includes all those acts, such as the gratification of hunger and the shun- ning of dangerous enemies, the effect of which is the mainte- nance of life. These acts are, in the higher animal world at least, prompted by special feelings ; but in many cases the individual is not conscious or aware of the results of complying with those promptings ; whereas in more advanced organisms, as in man, the effects of the compliance become clearly perceived, and, by being represented in consciousness, become in their turn prompting stimuli, whether the original prompting feeling be present or not. A child or an animal which, through pathologi- cal derangements, has lost its appetite will starve to death ; but a man, who foresees the effects of his present actions, will take food, even if he does not feel hungry, in order to preserve him- self. This intelligent compliance with rational promptings, with the express intention of attaining an end that in the lower animals is instinctively or unknowingly attained, may, for con- venience, be called a rationalized instinct. Note that in this case the object of the action is in fact what is expressed in lan- guage — namely, self-preservation; it is this end the individual has distinctly in view, and it is at this end that he aims. In
