Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 5.djvu/616

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600 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGl

consequence if it were not modifiable by us. It is, however, modifiable in two ways : either through devotion of labor-power, which increases the stock of the goods in question, or through devotion of already possessed objects, which as substitutes abolish the rarity of the most desired objects for the individual. Accord- ingly, we may say immediately that the scarcity of goods in pro- portion to the desires centering upon them objectively determines exchange ; that, however, the exchange on its side brings scarcity into force as an element of value. It is a thoroughgoing mistake of theories of value to assume that, when utility and rarity are given, economic value — that is, exchange movement — is some- thing to be taken for granted, a conceptually necessary conse- quence of those premises. In this they are by no means correct. In case, for instance, there were alongside of these presuppositions an ascetic renunciation, or if they only instigated to conflict or robbery — which is, to be sure, often enough the case — no eco- nomic value and no economic life would emerge. Exchange is a sociological structure sui generis, a primary form and function of inter-individual life, which by no means emerges as a logical consequence from those qualitative and quantitative properties of things which we call availability and rarity. On the contrary, it is rather the case that these two properties derive their value- creating significance only under the presupposition of exchange. Where exchange, the offering of a sacrifice for the purpose of a gain, is for any reason excluded, there no rarity of the desired object can confer upon it economic value until the possibility of that relation reappears. We may express the relation in this way : The significance of the object for the individual always rests merely in its desirability ; so far as that is concerned which the object is to do for us, its qualitative character is decisive, and when we have it, it is a matter of indifference in this respect whether there exist besides many, few, or no specimens of the same sort. (I do not treat here especially the cases in which rarity itself is a species of qualitative character, which makes the object desirable to us, as in the case of old postage stamps, curi- osities, antiquities without sesthetic or historical value, etc. I also disregard other cases, interesting in themselves, here however