Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 6.djvu/166

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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGl

stated, can its conduct be condemned. In a society of individuals ethically and intellectually perfect no such conflicts would occur. The controlling power would demand no sacri- fices which could not be ethically justified, and no individual would resist the enforcement of a control which he could see to be wise and proper.

It scarcely need be said that such a subordination of the individual to society as this has no essential points of resem- blance to that subjection of the individual to the welfare of its species which is implied in the biologic laws of "struggle for existence " and " survival of the fittest." The sacrifice demanded by these laws is ruthless, largely indiscriminative, and wholly selfish. So far as the process can be termed teleological, its sole aim is the improvement of the species, and the means employed one which contains no asking or possible granting of consent on the part of the individual victims. According to its principles the absolute annulment of every right of an indefinite number of individuals is justified if only the ultimate preserva- tion of the species be promoted. According to the transcenden- talist principle not the smallest demand may rightfully be made of a single person if this be the manner of, and the sole motive for, making it.

Nor can the subordination of the welfare of the individual to that of the species which is seen in the evolutionary process be defended upon a basis of utilitarian ethics. If, as Mr. Spencer and his school hold, utility is the determining criterion of rightfulness, then a sense of moral obligation cannot be conceived to exist except when the individual to be obligated himself recognizes the utility of the act demanded. If then, in any instance, the individual should assert, as indeed almost all individuals, if questioned, would assert, that he considers the welfare of future generations of less value to him than his own welfare or life, we cannot demand that such a one should feel morally obligated to obey the given behest. In case of refusal it might, upon utilitarian grounds, be justifiable for society at large to coerce him, but it could not judge him morally recalcitrant, nor could the victim feel otherwise than oppressed.