160 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
It may be anthropomorphic to attribute any maternal emotions of the human kind to the animal. The bird, perhaps, sits upon her eggs because they give her an agreeable sensation, or, if you please, from a blind instinct which somehow determines her to the practice. She does not look forward, we may suppose, to bringing up a family, or speculate upon the delights of domestic affection. I only say that as a fact she behaves in a way which is at once injurious to her own chances of individual survival and absolutely necessary to the survival of the species. The abnormal bird who deserts her nest escapes many dangers, but if all birds were devoid of the instinct, the birds would not survive a generation. 1
This inclusion of the ethical within the cosmic process removes the last possible ground of support for that fear which Mr. Spen- cer expresses in his Man versus the State, that man in attempting to interfere with laws of the latter is setting himself against august nature as natura naturans that he is, in effect, pitting the microcosm against the macrocosm. The danger of this pro- ceeding, he declares, is apparent in its very terms.
If the political meddler could be induced to contemplate the essential meaning of his plan, he would be paralyzed by the sense of his own temerity. He proposes to suspend in some way or degree that process by which all life has been evolved.
This fear of Mr. Spencer lest the cosmic forces be interfered with by man is one constantly reiterated by him. Yet does Mr. Spencer pretend to say that it is possible for man to defeat the operation of a natural or cosmic law ? Or, if he does, where does he draw the line between purely natural or cosmic action and artificial action ? If he would apply his censure to any effort on the part of man to escape from the operation of the competitive law, should he not, we may ask, extend his condemnation to any and all efforts of individuals of the brute creation to avoid dan- ger and to bring themselves into better adjustment of their milieu? Does not, in fact, all life, human as well as animal, imply a struggle for adaptation to environment? Also, it may pertinently be asked, why, if man is, as Mr. Spencer holds, able so potently to affect for evil the operation of natural forces, may he not, conceivably at least, be able to use his power for the accomplishment of good ? Or are natural laws of such a
1 Social Rights and Duties, I, p. 235.
