ETHICS OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 1/3
merit or demerit in all their degrees, and of rewarding them proportionately, either by increase or decrease of wages, or by changing the character of work required, then a truer and more beneficial competition will be maintained than the old compe- tition between concerns which the governmental monopoly will destroy. We are not, however, to be considered as main- taining that any such beneficent governmental management will be likely to result from public control, political morality and intelligence being what they now are. We should, in fact, expect the reverse. All that we wish to point out is that the applica- tion of the competitive principle would not necessarily, that is, under all conceivable conditions, exclude such governmental ownership and operation.
By way of summarization of the points of difference between the conclusions to which we have been led by the adoption of the competitive principle as an ideal one, and those reached by Mr. Spencer in applying the same principle, we may say : First, that, instead of leaving individuals to conduct their con- tests in their own way, unrestrained by social control, we would justify all actions of the state which will tend to raise the ethical plane of competition. Secondly, we would justify state inter- vention where such intervention is for the purpose of preventing oppression of individuals by each other. Thirdly, we would justify such intervention where, without it, monopolies or trusts would be organized under private management. Fourthly, we would justify state action where its influence is educative, or where it is limited to the performance of some duty which other- wise would not be performed at all. Fifthly, we would justify state action where, although its effect is to put an end to certain forms of competition, its result is the stimulation and mainte- nance of better forms of rivalry.
It is now necessary to answer one final question. It may be asked whether these kinds of governmental intervention which we have justified do not rest for their justification upon the implication of a certain amount of ignorance or viciousness on the part of the people, and whether, therefore, it is not true that as civilization advances the necessity for this intervention
