THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL NIETZSCHEISM 69 1
name for justice, and the sentiment of justice is purely altruistic. By establishing justice we shall check and resist practical Nietz- scheism, but we shall obtain no aid from the unconscious disci- ples of Nietzsche in our struggle for justice. We shall even encounter the resolute hostility of the honest but misguided element which justifies wrongful privilege in the name of the general welfare, just as slavery was defended on ethical and reli- gious grounds. It is necessary, therefore, to have the clearest and most conclusive demonstration of the equity and indispen- sableness of each of the demands put forward in the interest and under the high sanction of justice. We must have precise defi- nitions of the terms of the law and formula of justice, and rigorously logical deductions of the applications of the law to the concrete relations of men.
If justice means equality of opportunity and of liberty, what do we mean by equality of opportunity or of liberty ? What is, and what is not, consonant with the enjoined equality? For example, with reference to land and other natural resources, what is the logical implication of equal freedom ? Is private property in land compatible with justice ? If not, what principle should govern the tenure of land ? If the answer be affirmative, does private property justify the monopolization of large areas by individuals while tens of thousands go landless ? Are enor- mous accumulations of wealth permissible under the law of jus- tice ? Dr. Alfred A. Wallace, in one of his social essays just republished, asserts that the privilege of unlimited bequest and inheritance is a violation of equality of opportunity. In his opinion, the right of a man to enjoy the fruits of his honest labor does not include the unlimited right of directing the dis- position of his property after his death, and society may claim a share, if not the whole, of his surplus wealth. This deduction is vigorously contested by other advocates of equal opportunity. Who is right? What, in a word, are the limitations to be imposed on the individual in the interest of his fellow-members of society?
Professor Giddings, in his collection of essays entitled Democracy and Empire, attempts a reconciliation of those two
