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lower forms of animal life, particularly among the insects. 1 With the psychologists we have named, however, the "instinc- tive " is practically identified with the " innate," and " instincts" are simply " innate impulses " which tend to discharge them- selves in one way rather than in another; they are "inborn capacities to act with reference to biological ends;" 2 they are that part of our race heredity which manifests itself psychically, and hence they may be viewed as "species" or "race habits" in contrast with the acquired habits of individuals. In criticism of the narrower view of instinct adopted by Professor Baldwin it may well be urged that the " hard and fast" type of instinct is rarely met with among the higher animals. 3 Such animals as the dog, cat, and horse, for example, have almost no instincts which cannot be modified, even utterly changed, by training. Again, "ready-made activities" which are manifest soon after birth are comparatively few among all higher animals ; many of their instincts do not ripen until after physical maturity is reached. But, as we said above, the question is not at all one of terminology. This cannot be too strongly emphasized with refer- ence to the content of our criticism. It matters not whether we name the psychical aspects of race heredity "instincts" or not. The important thing is whether we recognize or not the part which the "innate," the species or race habit, plays in the men- tal life of individuals and in the social process. It would be unfair to Professor Baldwin to say that he in no way recognizes the importance of the innate save as has been indicated. For- mally he does; 4 but not in such a manner as to affect his
1 Social and Ethical Interpretations, pp. 61, 62. Professor Baldwin seems to adopt in the main Professor C. Lloyd Morgan's conception of instinct, which makes instinct the " crystallized form " of innate capacity or impulse. See MORGAN, Habit and Instinct.
- A definition formulated by Professor G. H. Mead. Compare Schneider's defini-
tion : " By instinct we understand the impulse to an action whose end the individual is unconscious of, but which nevertheless furthers the attainment of that end."
3 We cannot but remark Professor Baldwin's inconsistency in arguing that so indefinite and variable a thing as the tendency to imitate is a true instinct, while he holds that definiteness and invariability are the marks of all instinctive activity.
4 See especially the chapter on the person's instincts and emotions (chap, vi) in Social and Ethical Interpretations.
