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* Bio-pharmaceutical Industry: At the urging of a panel of forensic experts, in January 2002, investigators looked into the possibility that the production infrastructures in the bio­ pharmaceutical industry may have been exploited to make the spore powder used in the anthrax mailings. This initiative, titled the Bio-pharmaceutical National Initiative (“BNI”), sought to identify those commercial entities with the technical skills and necessary equipment to produce the type of refined spore powder recovered from the anthrax mailings. The BNI gathered information about individual companies, their laboratories and production facilities, and their employees’ access to the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis. The BNI placed particular emphasis on those bio-pharmaceutical companies located in the greater New Jersey area, and those using containment facilities, because work with Ba is usually done in a BSL-3 laboratory.

* Bio-pesticide Industry: The most widely used microbial pesticides incorporate strains of Bacillus thuringiensis (“Bt”), a spore-forming bacterium which is very similar to anthrax but harmless to humans. For this reason, Bt is sometimes used in the military and weapons of mass destruction defense community as a simulant for anthrax, both in laboratory research and in field training exercises. Many commercially available bio-pesticides use an aerosol delivery system to effect application of the product to the infested area. Consequently, investigators theorized that the same skill sets, manufacturing equipment, and production facilities used to make Bt pesticides also could be used to produce an anthrax spore powder like the one present in the anthrax mailings. Investigators identified the companies that produced Bt pesticides and the individuals there with expertise in the production of Bt. They also examined the equipment and procedures used by the companies to produce Bt.

* Laboratory Equipment Initiative: Assuming that the perpetrator must have used some type of containment device to produce the anthrax powder and load the envelopes, the Task Force sought to identify the laboratory equipment used to do so. Investigators collected environmental samples from biological “glove boxes,” or containment devices, located near Trenton, New Jersey, where the anthrax letters were postmarked. They also canvassed companies that serviced and maintained glove boxes, and they visited a resupplier of used and surplus laboratory equipment. From July 29, 2002 through December 16, 2002, 125 glove boxes were swabbed at 24 facilities in a five-state area encompassing New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. All collected samples were submitted for testing to the CDC in Atlanta, Georgia. This initiative did not produce anything of value to the investigation.

* Review of Correspondence to Senators Daschle and Leahy: Amerithrax investigators interviewed Senators Daschle and Leahy to see if they had any inkling as to why they had been specifically targeted. Their staff members and interns were also interviewed regarding any previous threats or suspicious contacts made to either Senator. In addition, investigators reviewed the files of the U.S. Capitol Police, the U.S. Secret Service, and other pertinent files for instances of threats made against either Senator. Investigators determined that none of these had any ostensible connection to the anthrax mailings.


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