Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/124

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SECTION VI.

Esteem: The one is amiable; the other awful: We could wish to meet the one Character in a Friend; the other we should be ambitious of in Ourselves. In like Manner the Approbation, which attends natural Abilities or Temperance or Industry, may be somewhat different from that which is paid to the social Virtues, without making them entirely of a different Species. And indeed, we may observe, that the natural Abilities, no more than the other Virtues, produce not, all of them, the same Kind of Approbation. Good Sense and Genius beget Esteem and Regard: Wit and Humour excite Love and Affection[1].

Most

  1. Love and Esteem are nearly the same Passion, and arise from similar Causes. The Qualities, which produce both, are such as communicate Pleasure. But where this Pleasure is severe and serious; or where its Object is great and makes a strong Impression, or where it produces any Degree of Humility and Awe: In all these Cases, the Passion, which arises from the Pleasure, is more properly denominated Esteem than Love. Benevolence attends both: But is connected with Love in a more eminent Degree. There seems to be still a stronger Mixture of Pride in Contempt than of Humility in Esteem; and the Reason would not be difficult to one, who study'd accurately the Passions. All these various Mixtures and Compositions and Appearances of Sentiment form a very curious Subject of Speculation, but are wide of our present Purpose. Thro'out these Essays, we always consider in general, what Qualities are a Subject of Praise or of Censure, without entering into all the minute Differences of Sentiment, which they excite. 'Tis evident, that whatever is con-

temn'd,