Page:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals - Hume (1751).djvu/130

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SECTION VI.

His Historian, therefore, ought not to have alone related what tended to his Reproach and Infamy; but also what might redound to his PRAISE and HONOUR.

In general, we may observe, that the Distinction of voluntary or involuntary was little regarded by the Antients in their moral Reasonings; where they frequently treated the Question as very doubtful, whether Virtue could be taught or not[1]? They justly consider'd, that Cowardice, Meanness, Levity, Anxiety, Impatience, Folly, and many other Qualities of the Mind, might appear ridiculous, and deform'd, contemptible and odious, tho' independant of the Will. Nor could it be suppos'd, at all Times, in every Man's Power to attain every Kind of mental, more than exterior Beauty.

But modern Philosophers, treating all Morals, as on a like Footing with civil Laws, guarded by the Sanctions of Reward and Punishment, were necessarily led to render this Circumstance, of voluntary or involuntary, the Foundation of their whole Theory. Every one may employ Terms in what Sense he pleases: But this, in the mean Time, must

  1. Vid. Plato in Menone, Seneca de otio sap. Cap. 31. So also Horace, Virtutem doctrina paret, naturane donet. Epist. Lib. 1. Ep. 18.

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